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INTRODUCTION
As concentration in the media has grown, so t o has the debate over the role of the FCC in
merger eview.  On the one hand, a host of critics has disparaged FCC review of mergers as
redundant of the more expert antitrust agencies, costly, time consuming, a means by which the agency
expands its powers beyond either statutory or prudential limits, and a general hindrance to the
development of an efficient market in the “new economy” where the old regulatory paradigms do not
apply. [CITES] Others have defended the FCC’s merger review as an important regulatory tool and
a vital protection t  the “marketplace of ideas” in a world dominated by an ever-smaller number of
conglomerates combining proprietary content with proprietary platforms. [CITES]
Most recently, the new Chairman of the FCC Michael Powell, joined by the two other
republican Commissioners, stated his formulation of the FCC’s public interest standard in merger
reviews. [CITE FOX/Chris-Craft]  Henceforth, the FCC will distinguish between media mergers and
common carrier mergers and apply different standards to the two. The FCC will review media
mergers to see whether they comply with the FCC’s existing rules.  If the proposed media merger
violates no rule, no further inquiry is necessary.  Only if the proposed media merger violates an FCC
rule will the Commission look further, to see if some waiver or condition is necessary.  By contrast,
in common carrier mergers, the FCC will continue to apply the more general public interest test set
forth in the Commission’s Order reviewing the Bell Atlantic/Nynex merger. [CITE].  Chairman
Powell, who as a Commissioner frequently inveighed against imposing conditions in media mergers,
[CITES], justified this dichotomy on the grounds that he Commission had extensive structural rules
1The two democratic Commissioners, dissented from Chairman Powell’s narrow vision of
the public interest.
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in media regulation, and that further eview in the merger context would “eviscerate” the benefit of
having such rules.1
Chairman Powell’s view of the FCC’s role in merger review presents difficulties, not the least
of which being that the neat division of the world into common carriers and mass media outlets no
longer exists.  The much discussed and anticipated convergence of technologies wedding content and
conduit renders this neat division obsolete on arrival.  It also fails to account for the increasingly
powerful network effects and other barriers to entry created by such mergers that inhibit or prevent
competition from new entrants o offset he increased concentration.  It also ignores the plain reading
of the communications Act, which requires a specific inquiry into each license transfer as to whether
it serves the public interest. [CITE]
This most profoundly effects the diversity of voices and opinions available in the marketplace
of ideas.  As the dissenters in the Fox/Chris-Craft merger observed, the ability to pass information
freely and to hear a diversity of views is the essential machinery of democracy.  The FCC’s
abandonment of its responsibilities allows the few controllers of vast communications networks to
act as media gate keepers, controlling what he public can see, hear, and say.  Given the assault upon
the FCC’s structural rules by the District of Columbia Circuit, and the continued concentration of
both content production and distribution channels in the hands of a few under the existing regime, the
FCC’s new standard of review constitutes a grave threat to the freedom of the marketplace of ideas.
I have written elsewhere in defense of the FCC’s merger review authority and how it differs
from that of the antitrust agencies – the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade
2Pub. L. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1394 (1976) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §18a).
3Section 7 of the Clayton Act (codified at 15 U.S.C. §18) prohibits mergers or acquisitions
“the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a
monopoly.”
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Commission (FTC) – charged with reviewing mergers generally under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act
(HSRA).2  This paper focuses on the flaws in the Chairman’s new formulation and the need for the
FCC to perform a more thorough merger review taking into account the reality of the new,
networked world.  Contrary to myth, absent federal regulation, the networked world is marked by
high barriers to entry and little opportunity for competition to develop.  In particular, the marketplace
of ideas remains highly vulnerable to mergers that do not pose significant competitive risk under
traditional antitrust analysis.
Looking briefly to other areas where Congress has imposed an additional layer of merger
review by an expert agency, notably electric power & natural gas, banking, and transportation, a
pattern emerges.  These areas are generally marked by centrality to the economy, high barriers to
entry, strong network effects, and the presence of local markets that would go unserved or
underserved without federal intervention.  Because of these factors, Congress has found these areas
affected with the public interest.  Because of the dangers presented by concentration in these
industries, Congress has proven far more “risk averse” in allowing consolidation.  Congress therefore
created a requirement that parties wishing to merge demonstrate the merger serves the public interest,
a more stringent requirement than that generally applicable under Section 7 of the Clayton Act.3
It is instructive to observe that in areas partially or entirely deregulated by Congress,
transportation a d banking, barriers to entry had generally declined prior to deregulation and
Congress left intact l ws requiring nondiscriminatory service or other ules designed to address the
4needs of potentially underserved communities.
Turning to communications, the factors arguing for continued review remain.
Telecommunications remains not merely vital to the economy, but to the proper functioning of
democracy.  In the absence of federal rules mandating non-discrimination network effects and high
costs operate to exclude new entrants.  For example, before the Cable Act of 1992 and the Satellite
Home Improvement Act of 1999 provided DBS broadcasters with access to national and local
programming, DBS could not compete with cable in the program distribution market.  In the absence
of an open access requirement for cable, cable has remained impenetrable to local (and most national)
ISPs.
Contrary to the Chairman’s formulation, however, the potentials for abuse are not wholly
addressed by either the existing rules or by the rulemaking process.  Mergers permit new
configurations of content and conduit not previous ubject to rulemaking consideration.  The merger
process i  designed to give these new configurations, which effect not merely the participants but the
nation as a whole, the regulatory scrutiny they require.  In addition, the flexibility of merger review
permits the FCC to narrowly tailor any needed regulation of the needs of the marketplace.  Nor does
it “eviscerate” the value of the FCC’s existing rules.  Finally, in light of the recent hostility of the
Federal Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia Circuit to the FCC’s structural rules, intense
scrutiny of mergers may become the FCC’s only means of preserving what diversity remains in the
marketplace of ideas.
PART I – OTHER AREAS SUBJECT TO ADDITIONAL REVIEW
In only a few sectors of the economy has Congress chosen to impose an additional layer of
review of mergers beyond that mandated by the HSRA.  Under the Bank Merger Act, mergers of
4See generally PHILIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN
ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION (2000) §2C-2 ¶251f (“Areeda”). 
As Areeda explains, different savings institutions are regulated by different federal agencies.
5Areeda ¶251g.
624 Stat 379 (1887).  In many ways, the ICC served as a model for the FCC, including its
use of the public interest standard. [CITE]
7ICC Termination Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-88, see also 49 USC §§701 et seq.
(transferring remaining powers to newly created Surface Transportation Board).
8The same case cannot be said for motor transport, where few barriers to entry exist.  It
seems likely that regulation of motor transport is something of an aberration, and as Areeda
suggests, probably should not have been subject to merger regulation at all.  Areeda ¶251i. 
5
banks and other savings institutions are reviewed by the agency charged with regulating the savings
institution.4  Mergers of electric utilities and natural gas providers are reviewed by the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC).5  Transportation mergers, first regulated by the Interstate
Commerce Commission i  1887 and focusing at that time on regulation of the railroads,6 were
deregulated by Congress over time, culminating in the abolishment of the ICC in 1995.7
These areas have several elements in common.  First, they are traditionally marked by large
networks with significant build out costs, where the combination f network effects and other barriers
to entry create the potential for monopoly and anticompetitive practices.  In the case of electricity and
natural gas, this arises from the classic conditions that used to define a “natural monopoly.”  The
movement of natural gas or electricity is relatively cheap once the network is in place, but build out
costs are high.  Larger networks allow much greater efficiencies with little marginal costs for each
new customer, so that larger networks can simply underprice new entrants until they fold.  When the
ICC was first established, railroads operated und r similar conditions, as did the airline industry in
its infancy when start up costs were enormous.8  Banks, while not have the same physical access
9See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. §2901 (banks managed “for the needs of the community”); 15 U.S.C.
717(a) (distribution of natural gas is “affected with the public interest”). 
10See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. 824b (FERC shall not permit the transfer of assets unless it finds the
transfer “consistent with the public interest.”
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problem, require normous start up capital and new entrants suffer from a lengthy period when they
must establish their trustworthiness to the market.
Because circumstances make it difficult for new entrants, the market tends toward
concentration with the inevitable problems of monopoly control.  This problem is further complicated
by recognition of these services as critical to the average citizen to participate in society.  Yet without
federal intervention, the poorest members of society and minorities traditionally subject to
discrimination may not receive service, or may receive only inferior service at high prices.  
As a result, Congress has found that hese industries are affected with the public interest.9 One
aspect of regulation i  the public interest is that mergers must herefore serve the public interest.10
Contrary to critics, then, the treatment of the merger process as a quasi-regulatory adjudicative
proceeding does not represent some sort of agency bias toward expanding its own power or toward
regulation generally. [CITES] Rather, it represents a reflection of Congress’ affirmative charge to the
agency.
It is instructive to examine the areas Congress has deregulated.  Although Congress initially
regulated transportation tightly, it has deregulated it almost completely.  Looking to the reality of
transportation, the reasons conform to the general model set forth above.  Rail, the mode of
transportation requiring the reatest build out, has ceased to be a dominant form of transportation.
Travel by car and transportation by truck is not marked by the same barriers to entry as rail travel.
11In no small part because the necessary infrastructure, such as roads, air ports, and traffic
management, are non-proprietary. 
12As the Fox/Chris-Craft dissenters pointed out, the agency itself has previously
recognized the need for broader application of the public interest test in mass media mergers. 
Indeed, in the AOL-TW Merger, the Commission explicitly rejected the attempt by the applicants
to portray the merger as a simple cross-check against the Commission's rules. [CITE Wright
Letter]   
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Even barriers to entry in air travel and freight have greatly diminished.11  As a result, the need for
government management of the industry has disappeared and review of mergers under the Clayton
Act standard suffices to preserve competition.
PART II -- THE COMMUNICATIONS MARKET
Looking to the communications market, he factors that mandate r gulation – and therefore
regulation of mergers – in the public interest remain.  Despite recent set backs to the technology
sector, telecommunications and mass medi remain critical components of participation i  modern
society.  Most significantly, the mass media remain the primary means by which Americans educate
themselves on news and access entertainment.  Even if one includes the Internet as an alternative to
mass media such as television, radio and cable, that merely pushes the problem back to the
telecommunications sector as a whole.
Indeed, with the continued convergence of all telecommunications sectors, the division of the
world into convenient categories such as “mass media” and “common carrier” become increasingly
artificial.  As cable operators increasingly offer the next generation of interactive services such as
broadband access and interactive t levision and television broadcasters use theirsp ctrum to offer
telecommunication services uch as datacasting, the more a merger analysis based solely on the
historic function of the licensees misses the full story.12  The Commission is charged with monitoring
8and encouraging competition and diversity in the Communications sector as a whole, it cannot
reasonably limit its analysis to one historic activity of the licensee and consider its statutory obligation
filled.
Critics frequently charge that the drafters of the Telecommunications Act of 1996
demonstrated a preference for deregulation, i cluding a preference for more relaxed merger scrutiny.
This confuses a preference for ompetition with a preference for deregulation.  The drafters of the
1996 Act expected a competitive environment to emerge which would render structural regulation
unnecessary.  But -- in an apparent recognition that even Congress is not omniscient -- the drafters
did not curtail the FCC's function as the monitor of the telecommunications sector or restrain its
merger review authority.  Indeed, the alteration Congress did make to the FCC's merger authority,
removing the ability of the FCC to immunize certain mergers from antitrust review, suggests the
opposite conclusion: Congress knew that its predictive judgment might prove wrong, and did not
wish to remove the one remaining safety valve to industry concentration.
Events have born out the wisdom of this prudence.  The changes created by the 1996 Act
have not created the anticipated competition.  The seven regional Bell operating companies and GTE
have merged own to four expanded local monopolies with no interest in competing in each other's
territories.  Cable operators have likewise consolidated, producing neither overbuilders nor a second
telephone wire into the home.  Radio and television broadcasters have also consolidated, with two
television networks reaching more than 40% of the total audience of the United Statesin violation
of the FCC's existing rules and the remaining networks at the limit.
The difficulties of would-be ntrants demonstrate that he physical and economic barriers to
entry remain in the telecommunications sector.  In the provision of telecommunications and Internet
9services, an initially vigorous attempt at overbuilding has collapsed, leaving the local monopolies to
dominate the market.  In addition to the expense and difficulty in wooing customers from established
networks, competitors have cited the control of the local network by a competitor and the failure of
the FCC to enforce compliance with the regulations mandating access as a primary reason for the
failure of competition to emerge.  In the cable industry, overbuilders and alternate multichannel video
programming distributors (MVPDs) have run into similar problems, facing resistance from entrenched
cable operators.  Indeed, only one competitor to cable has emerged in the MVPD market, Direct
Broadcast Satellite (DBS).  This success was not achieved by competition in the free market, but by
massive intervention  behalf of DBS on the part of Congress to provide access to programming and
require non-discrimination by vertically integrated cable operator.
Finally, in the broadcast medium, the continued scarcity of licenses -- re-enforced by the
ability of the incumbents to lobby effectively against the FCC's attempts o open the spectrum to new
entrants -- and the relaxation of the FCC's structural rules has lead to consolidation on an
unprecedented l vel.  The relaxation of the "dual network rule" allows the larger established networks
and their emerging competitors o exist under joint ownership, while the relaxation of the national
ownership limits and the one-to-a-market rule have allowed networks and large ownership groups
to acquire the majority of independent broadcasters or smaller groups which might provide local
diversity and competition for advertising revenue.
Nor has competition emerged from the Internet.  Mistaking the FCC's mandate of non-
discrimination for "enhanced services" for lack of regulation, Congress proudly proclaimed in the
1996 Act that "_____."  Those opposed to regulation frequently cite the Internet as the paradigm for
"unregulation" and competition.
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This view, of course, overlooks or ignores the lengthy history of government-mandated op n
access in the pre-1996 Act world. As others have observed, the competitive and open Internet that
existed at the time of the 1996 Act did not happen by accident or by a miracle of the invisible hand
of the market.  It was the direct result of a regulatory decision to promote competition via regulation
by mandating open access to the communications network.
This revisionism has consequences.  The FCC has refused to mandate the same non-
discrimination requirements on the emerging high-speed networks, with the exception of the high-
speed telephone networks, where non-discriminatory access to the physical network is required by
law. 
As a result of this failure to regulate, competition to existing MVPDs or even basic
telecommunications services has failed to emerge from the Internet.  Congress' failure to provide a
mechanical license for Internet broadcasting, as it did with cable an DBS, has effectively pr vented
the Internet from emerging as a competitor to established radio and television broadcasters or cable.
Those anticipating that the Internet would provide a competitive market in telephony services
overlooked both the technical challenges and the resistance of the local monopolies. Furtherm re,
the failure to impose open access on cable, the emerging leader in residential broadband access, has
lead to a steady decline in competition i  the provision of even basic Internet services.  Significantly,
the one area that has hitherto been marked by the greatest competition, commercial Internet access,
exists on the most regulated and mandatorily opened network.
To summarize, the factors that mandate for a public interest merger review in the
telecommunications sector emain.  In the absence of government action, competition has not and will
not emerge.  As in other sectors identified in Part I, the result of concentration in the absence of
13Even if one accepts the argument that a monopolist has no incentive to discriminate and
every incentive to maximize programming diversity, it makes monopoly control no more
palatable.  Leaving aside the numerous real-world examples in which monopolists have chosen to
forgo short-term profits from other sources in favor of maintaining their core monopoly, the
ability of a single entity to small group to act as a censor to the public creates problems with the
free flow of information and ideas.  As an initial matter, society should not have to tolerate in a
private entity what it would find intolerable on government.  Furthermore, the willingness of
information providers to self-censor and tailor offerings to the perceived preferences of the media
gatekeeper creates as much of a bottleneck to information as active discrimination.  Finally, the
efficiencies achieved by monopoly may act against the public interest.  It is efficient to scale news
resources so that a single newsroom or news network provides news, while the remaining channel
on the network provide entertainment.  But the public suffers from the failure of competition in
the news sector.  The number of editorial voices interpreting the news is diminished and fewer
items will be covered.  As a result, access to information, a critical component of a democratic
society, is curtailed.
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government regulation would be to leave segments of society vulnerable to total lack of service or
significant underservice, and to subject society as a whole to the ills of monopoly control over a vital
sector of the economy.
Added to this factor lies the profound effect of such concentration  democracy.  Since the
first days of radio, Congress, the FCC and the courts have recognized that he operation of the mass
media have a profound effect on the free flow of ideas and information.  Where one entity or
oligopoly control that flow, it creates the risk that he "media gatekeeper" will control what he public
see, hear and say.  The dangers of such a system of centralized control of information are no less
troublesome when a private corporation exercises that power as when a government censor does.13
PART III -- MERGER REVIEW RATHER THAN STRUCTURAL REGULATION
While the arguments above may make the case for regulation generally, they do not
necessarily make the case for merger review.  It would seem, at first glance, that to the extent a need
for regulation remains, Chairman Powell's formulation in Fox/Chris-Craft has merit.
A closer examination, however, eveals the flaws in the Chairman's formulation.  Briefly, the
12
rules establish guidelines, but these guidelines cannot take the place of a fact-based determination in
complex mergers -- particularly in the emerging networked world. 
Indeed, the dynamic nature of the networked world extolled by the critics of merger review
is precisely what makes merger eview superior to rulemaking.  A rulemaking proceeding cannot
foresee all possibilities.  When a new situation emerges, the Communications Act and prudence both
demand an examination to determine whether the transfer of an FCC license serves “the public
interest, convenience and necessity.”  The failure to foresee a possible combination should not act as
a free pass from public scrutiny.
Consider, for example, the merger of America Online and Time Warner.  No FCC rule
explicitly addressed the situation that arose when the largest Internet access provider and one of the
most aggressive proponents of non-cable broadband bought a vertically integrated cable company.
Under the Chairman’s formulation, the FCC should simply have approved the merger without
examination of the consequences.  In the Powell formulation, the FCC should simply permit the
merger to take place and any subsequent i jury to competition or the marketplace of die as should
be addressed via the rulemaking process.
